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Compulsory Home Repair Laws
Maynard L. Graft, Jr.*
N RECENT YEARS legislative bodies at various levels of government have
recognized the need for legally requiring the maintenance of housing
at certain minimum standards. Such regulation has been deemed neces-
sary because of the deterioration experienced by practically every major
city in America. This deterioration causes a downward spiral usually
resulting in complete blight in the deteriorating area.' The first step
toward blight is slight deterioration followed by neglect of repairs by
owners and landlords (the latter neglect is an attempt to maintain a
high return on investment, the former because of loss of faith in the
quality of the neighborhood). In the final analysis purchasers who
might have invested in and maintained the neighborhood abandon the
area and it is left to rot and die. 2 The impact of poor housing on the
community and its members was recognized by Justice Douglas in
Berman v. Parker:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than
spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffer the
spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle.
They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which
robs it of its charm, which makes it a place from which men turn.
The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer
may ruin a river.3
Building Maintenance Housing Codes
In an effort to curb blighting conditions, and in many cases to re-
store blighted areas, most major cities passed housing codes and have
been enforcing them for some time. Some have gone further, and have
enacted stern anti-deterioration laws. One such city is Shaker Heights,
Ohio, one of the suburbs of Cleveland, and long famous as a wealthy
residential area. The purpose of the Shaker Heights Code is to estab-
lish minimum standards of health and safety, and to establish stand-
ards of maintenance to prevent any dwelling from having a blighting
or deteriorating effect on the community.4 In the June, 1970, issue of
Spectrum, an informational publication of the City of Shaker Heights,
there is emphasis on the fact that good maintenance means high property
values.
* B.B.A., Kent State University; Fourth-year student at Cleveland State University
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1 Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801 (1965).
2 Id.
3 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
4 Housing Code, City of Shaker Heights (Ohio) § 1403.01 (1967).
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The Housing Code authorizes inspections by the Commissioner of
Buildings and his staff5 and requires notification to the homeowner of
any violation of the Code.6 Chapter 1411 of the Code details the basic
standards for housing which relate to habitable floor area, light and
ventilation, heating and electrical requirements and, most pertinent to
this discussion, the maintenance requirements.
The maintenance requirements relate to building interiors and ex-
teriors and surrounding property. The interior must be kept in good
repair, with walls free from cracks, holes, etc.7 The building exterior
must be painted to prevent decay, and any rotted or decayed portions of
the dwelling must be replaced with materials that conform to the original
design of the building.8 The requirements for maintenance of the dwell-
ing structure also apply to any appurtenant or secondary structures on
the property.9 The ordinance also requires that all exterior areas of the
property must be kept clear of any objects or debris that may cause a
health or safety hazard or constitute a blighting or deteriorating in-
fluence on the neighborhood.1 0
The Housing Code has enforcement provisions which are set out
in Chapter 1409. Section 1409.04 authorizes the Commissioner of Build-
ings to order an offending building vacated if the owner fails to comply
with a notice of violation. The Commissioner may also request the Di-
rector of Law to institute legal proceedings to require compliance with
the notice of violation. Section 1409.99 also provides for a maximum
fine of $500.00 or a maximum jail sentence of six months for failure
to comply with a notice of violation, and makes each day of violation a
separate offense.
Authority for Enactment
In Ohio, local governing bodies are granted the authority to create
and enforce housing regulations by the State Constitution and Ohio
statutes. With respect to the Constitution, the "Home Rule" Amendment
grants municipalities the right to adopt any local police regulations that
are not in conflict with general laws.1 More specifically, Ohio Revised
Code, section 3781.01, provides that municipal corporations may make
building regulations that are additional to those provided in Chapter
3781, as long as such additional laws are not in conflict with existing
state law. 12
5 Id. at § 1409.01.
6 Id. at § 1409.03.
7 Id. at § 1411.22.
s Id. at § 1411.21.
9 Id.
10 Id. at § 1411.24.
1 Ohio Const. Art. XVIII, §§ 3 & 7.
12 Ohio Rev. Code § 3781.01.
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The authority granted by the Constitution and statutes, however,
presupposes that the enactment will involve a subject matter that is
within the power of the local government to regulate. To be within the
power of regulation, the enactment must relate to the government's
police power and it was decided in the leading case on the subject
that police power regulations are constitutional
whenever they are necessary for the preservation of public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare, and not unjustly discriminatory,
or arbitrary, or unreasonable, or confiscatory in their application to
a particular or specific piece of property. 13
Clearly then, when the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare is not involved, the regulation has no support under the police
power. 14 In this regard the Ohio Supreme Court has cautioned that
while the police power is broad and inclusive, it may not foster regula-
tions that are arbitrary and/or unreasonable, and that the regulations
must be suited to accomplish the lawful goal, must not be discriminatory
in operation, must bear a substantial relationship to the purpose of regu-
lation and must not interfere with private property beyond the needs of
the situation.' 5
That the subject of housing regulation generally is within the scope
of a municipality's police power is clear. In State of Ohio ex rel Schul-
man v. City of Cleveland, the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
upheld the right of a municipality under its police power to enact or-
dinances controlling the use and maintenance of privately owned struc-
tures.1' Further, an Ohio case paraphrasing Article I Section 19 of the
Ohio Constitution contained a statement to the effect that all private
property is held subservient to the police power and that when condi-
tions so require, such property may be regulated in the best interests
of the public safety and welfare. 1'7
Validity of Housing Codes
Housing codes are generally valid if they have a proper relation
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. The relation of
an ordinance to public health and safety is usually not too difficult to
establish. In a case involving the public safety, the Ohio Supreme Court
was called upon to decide whether or not the Dayton, Ohio building
code, which prohibited the erection of double acting doors in commercial
establishments, was valid.' 8 The court upheld the ordinance after placing
13 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
14 Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
15 Froelich v. The City of Cleveland, 99 Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919).
16 8 Ohio Misc. 1, 37 Ohio Ops. 2d 12, 220 N.E. 2d 386 (1966).
17 State ex rel McElroy v. City of Akron, 173 Ohio St. 189, 181 N.E. 2d 26 (1962).
18 City of Dayton v. S. S. Kresge Co., 114 Ohio St. 624, 151 N.E. 775 (1926).
May 1971
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
COMPULSORY HOME REPAIR
considerable weight on the testimony of the city's witness who testified
that double acting doors can interrupt free egress in an emergency
while doors that open outward only are much more conducive to the
public safety.19 In 1966, a decision was rendered which firmly sustained
the validity of the goals of housing codes as they relate to public health
and sanitation.20 In this case the plaintiff was informed by the East
Cleveland City Commission that his family was too large for the quarters
he was then occupying and that he would have to make use of addi-
tional space available in the dwelling or move out entirely (plaintiff
was renting the first floor of his double home to another family). Plain-
tiff claimed that the Housing Code of East Cleveland was not valid in
that it deprived him of his property without compensation and was un-
reasonable, arbitrary and capricious. The court upheld the code as a
valid exercise of the police power:
There is no question that the purposes of the housing code; fire
safety, sanitation, health, crime prevention, maintenance of prop-
erty, neighborhood, and community are matters of public welfare,
and are today well within the scope of the police power. 2 1
In another case decided in 1966, the court upheld a Cleveland re-
newal plan which authorized inspection of slum dwellings with the goal
of eventual destruction if the deficiencies were not corrected. 22 In this
case the plaintiff was the owner of two vacant dwellings on Hough
Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio, an area widely known for its deteriorating
condition. Each house had been inspected and found to be a public
nuisance because of badly deteriorated interiors, exteriors, absence of
plumbing, etc. After numerous requests for corrective action were
ignored, the houses were scheduled for razing, whereupon plaintiff
brought his action. The court viewed the action as one presenting the
question whether a city may, through the use of housing codes, inspect
buildings in a deteriorating neighborhood, find conditions that endanger
the public health and safety, and then notify the owner that the con-
ditions must be corrected or the building will be destroyed. Despite
the plaintiff's contention that the action of the city was in violation of
his constitutional rights forbidding the taking of property without just
compensation or due process, the court decided that the city had the
right to enact and enforce its housing code under its inherent police
power, and that no person had the right to maintain his property to
the detriment of the public. 23
19 Id. at 631-2.
20 Nolden v. East Cleveland City Commission, 12 Ohio Misc. 205, 41 Ohio Ops. 2d 291,
232 N.E. 2d 421 (1966).
21 Id. at 210.
22 Supra, n. 16 at 12-13.
23 Id. at 22.
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Thus, where the relationship of the enactment to the health and
safety of the public is easily recognized, both the validity and the virtue
is clear. The difficulty arises, however, where that close relationship
becomes less easily ascertainable. At that point enter the infirmities.
One of the criteria supporting the use of the police power is the
"general welfare." Interpreting what is in the interest of the "general
welfare" has caused the courts some difficulty with the result that many
courts must consider the evidence and make a subjective judgment as
to the relationship to the general welfare. One Ohio court, in refusing
to grant permission for the excavation of a road near the site of a newly
constructed interstate highway, placed a very broad definition on the
general welfare by extending it to include any enactment that would em-
brace health, peace, safety, morals, economic welfare, convenience and
community prosperity. 24 On the other hand, in State ex rel Stulbarg v.
Leighton, dismay was expressed over the broad and inclusive definition
of general welfare expounded by some courts, and it was noted that al-
most all regulation had been supported by the court as having some
relationship to the general welfare. It was felt that many judicial and
legislative sins had been committed in the name of "general welfare." 25
One housing code objective that has been receiving mixed sup-
port within the general welfare criterion is the objective of good "neigh-
borhood appearance." In earlier times regulation of neighborhoods
merely for aesthetic reasons was strictly forbidden. Youngstown v.
Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co. spoke out against aesthetic control when invali-
dating a Youngstown zoning ordinance. The reason for its invalidity
was that a police power regulation must be supported by some public
necessity and there was no public need available to support aesthetic
considerations. The court went on to state that while most authorities
could agree on laws necessary to preserve the public health, the con-
ception of what is aesthetically proper is a matter of opinion that varies
from person to person.26 For these reasons the court denounced aesthe-
tic regulation and the decision was specifically referred to and followed
in an Ohio case decided four years later 27 in which the City of Athens,
Ohio attdmpted to prohibit the erection of a gas station on the ground
that it would detract from the appearance of the neighborhood.
The attitude toward aesthetic regulation may be changing, how-
ever. While the courts are cautious in upholding aesthetic concepts be-
cause of the inherent subjectivity of the standard of application, they
are nevertheless upholding police power enactments where aesthetics is
24 In re Vacation of Township Road 114, Hancock County, 6 Ohio App. 2d 73, 216
N.E. 2d 768 (1966).
25 State ex rel Stulbarg v. Leighton, 113 Ohio App. 487, 173 N.E. 2d 715 (1959).
26 City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Building Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 148 N.E. 842
(1925).
27 State ex rel Srigley v. Woodworth, 33 Ohio App. 406, 169 N.E. 713 (1929).
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one, but not the sole, justification for the law.2 8 The view is generally
supported that aesthetics will be upheld if they are not the overwhelming
consideration in the regulation.2 9 The United States Supreme Court has
stated that "it is within legislative powers that a city should be beautiful
as well as healthy." 30 Similarly, a 1968 Ohio case holding that a law
requiring that junk yards be located and fenced so as not to be ap-
parent to the public view, was valid even though it was based primarily
on aesthetic considerations.3 1
Section 1411.21 (replacements must conform to original design) and
Section 1411.24 (exterior property must not have a blighting influence
on the neighborhood) of the Shaker Heights Code both deal with
aesthetic values, and these aesthetic values are energetically enforced
by the inspectors in their daily routine of inspecting properties. In the
past these objectives of beauty would have rendered the code provisions
void. Considering recent decisions, it is difficult to determine whether
or not the provisions would be upheld today, but they would definitely
be held invalid if the evidence showed that they were administered in
an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.
An infirmity in some housing codes, including the Shaker Heights
Code, is the lack of standards established for functionaries to follow
necessitating arbitrary administration by those entrusted with code en-
forcement. For example, a portion of the above mentioned Section
1411.24 of the Shaker Code reads as follows: "Lawns, landscaping and
driveways shall also be maintained so as not to constitute a blighting or
deteriorating effect in the neighborhood." Neither "blight" nor "de-
terioration" is included in the definitions section of the Housing Code.
How then, one might ask, can one be sure that he is or is not maintaining
his lawn, landscaping or driveway in a blighting or deteriorating man-
ner? Simple, says the city! Our inspectors will tell you! Herein lies the
infirmity. The Housing Code authorizes the Commissioner of Buildings
to adopt any rules and regulations that he deems fit to aid in the in-
terpretation and enforcement of the code.
3 2
On August 5, 1970, the Assistant Commissioner of Buildings for the
City of Shaker Heights stated, in an interview, that no rules and regu-
lations had been prepared for use by inspectors, nor were they neces-
sary. It was his feeling that all of the city inspectors had years of
building trades experience and were therefore qualified to pass judg-
ment on housing deficiencies. With respect to structural and mechani-
cal deficiencies and obvious health and safety hazards, he may be correct,
28 Newsom, Zoning for Beauty, 5 N. Eng. L. Rev. 1 (1969).
29 Annot., 21 A.L.R. 3d, 1225 (1968).
30 Supra, n. 3 at 33.
31 State v. Buckley, 16 Ohio St. 2d 128, 45 Ohio Ops. 2d 469, 243 N.E. 2d 66 (1968).
32 Housing Code, City of Shaker Heights (Ohio) § 1409.08, supra, n. 4.
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but trades experience does not qualify one to be a proper judge capable
of perceiving the point at which a lawn or driveway graduates into
the position of causing a "blight" or "deterioration" in the neighborhood.
Without further specific interpretation, an inspector is not equipped
to determine for himself that a lawn liberally populated with weeds or
an untrimmed bush or a cracked driveway (not causing a safety hazard)
constitutes a blighting and deteriorating effect on the community.
In 1955, a zoning ordinance which forbade the erection of a filling
station on plaintiff's property, was struck down by the Ohio Supreme
Court because it failed to provide proper guides to administrative of-
ficials relative to enforcing its provisions.3 3 The court stated that suffi-
cient standards and criteria must be established and that failure to pro-
vide these standards to officials allows the exercise of discretionary
powers with respect to another's property. The court felt that if the
ordinance made the absolute enjoyment of one's property subject to the
arbitrary will of the city officials, then it could not be upheld because it
failed to provide a uniform rule of action and was therefore unconstitu-
tional.34 In another case not related to housing but emphasizing the
necessary clarity of statutes, the defendant was arrested for preaching
on a public street corner. The arrest was held to be in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights because the statute under which he was
arrested made it unlawful to congregate on street corners in such vague
terms that one would not know if he were in violation. The court held
that whenever an ordinance is so vague that "reasonable men would
have to guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application" it is viola-
tive of due process and, in this instance, did not provide any standards
to guide the police in its enforcement.35 In regard to providing stand-
ards, the above-cited portion of Section 1411.24 of the Shaker Heights
Code, standing alone, is unenforceable as it currently stands.
Another potential problem in the area of housing code enforce-
ment presents itself in the 1967 United States Supreme Court decision
in Camara v. San Francisco, limiting a city's right to authorize housing
inspections. 36 Prior to this decision, housing inspections were being con-
ducted in Ohio cities with the blessings of the Ohio Supreme Court.
Housing inspections, it was said in the Eaton case, were not violative of
Fourth Amendment freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, be-
cause the results of the inspection were not later used as the basis of a
criminal prosecution.37 The Camara case, however, held that a housing
33 State ex rel Selected Properties Inc., v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 N.E. 2d 371
(1955).
34 Id.
35 City of Cleveland v. Baker, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 502, 504, 167 N.E. 2d 119 (1960).
36 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
37 State ex rel Eaton v. Price, 168 Ohio St. 123, 5 Ohio Ops. 2d 377, 157 N.E. 2d 523
(1958).
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inspection conducted over the objection of the homeowner and without
a warrant did violate the Fourth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution.
In so deciding the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision in Frank
v. Maryland,3 S which had been specifically followed by the Ohio Su-
preme Court in the Eaton case, cited above. The Court apparently did
not forbid the use of area, external inspections with subsequent notice of
violation but did list the three conditions under which an interior in-
spection may lawfully be made:
1. When given consent by the owner;
2. After issuance of a warrant supported by reasonable cause;
or
3. Under emergency conditions.
Officials of the City of Shaker Heights have interpreted the case so as
not to forbid internal inspection of homes occupied by persons other
than the owner and, curiously enough, not to forbid internal inspections
of two-family dwellings whether occupied by the owner or otherwise.39
Perhaps the interpretation is not so unusual when viewed with knowl-
edge of the fact that the areas in which two-family homes are located
are older, becoming increasingly integrated and are inspected more
regularly than homes in other areas. The city, it appears, has selected
those areas requiring most attention and has interpreted the case so as
not to conflict with established objectives.
It seems clear that the court intended in Camara to limit the mu-
nicipality's right to enter upon a homeowner's property and cite for code
violations without a warrant or other sufficient provocation, and it seems
equally clear that the above-mentioned interpretation is erroneous. Any
homeowner or occupier would be legally justified in refusing admittance
to an inspector not in possession of a warrant when emergency condi-
tions do not exist.
Validity of Housing Codes in Other Jurisdictions
The laws of other states seem to be clearly in support of housing
codes that deal primarily with matters of public health and safety40
but not so clearly in support of code regulation based on aesthetics and
maintenance of property to protect property values.
In 1959, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the housing code
of the City of Milwaukee to the extent of declaring that the main-
38 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
39 Interview with Mr. James F. Vales, Assistant Commissioner of Buildings for the
City of Shaker Heights, Ohio, in Shaker Heights (August 5, 1970).
40 Abbate Bros. v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill. 2d 337, 142 N.E. 2d 691 (1957); City of
Louisville v. Thompson, 339 S.W. 2d 869 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960); Adamec v. Post, 273
N.Y.S. 250, 7 N.E. 2d 120 (1937); Paquette v. City of Fall River, 338 Mass. 368, 155
N.E. 2d 775 (1959); Richards v. City of Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E. 2d 683 (1955).
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tenance of adjoining property values was a subject matter within the
jurisdiction of the police power.4 1 In this case the plaintiff sought to
enjoin the City of Milwaukee from enforcing its housing code against
his property. Along with claiming that his property was being taken
from him without due process of law, plaintiff alleged that a portion of
the ordinance which required that all exterior surfaces be painted was
void as it related primarily to aesthetics and was not a valid exercise
of the police power. The court in reply to plaintiff's argument pro-
nounced that even though the paint requirement did not have a direct
relationship to health or safety, the house if not painted would soon be-
come an eyesore and depreciate adjoining property values. In the esti-
mation of the court, the police power extended to preserving the good
order of the city and to prohibiting actions that lower property values.
4 2
On the other hand, in 1967, the Supreme Court of Georgia held void
the requirement that interior and exterior surfaces be painted.
43
The courts of the State of Pennsylvania struck down ordinances in
192644 and again in 195445 because in both cases the major objectives of
the enactments were to conserve property values an to promote aes-
thetic considerations. In the 1926 case, the court said that the legisla-
ture cannot arbitrarily interfere with the private ownership of property
simply by labeling a law as in the interest of the public welfare.46 In
the 1954 case, the court was in sympathy with the desire of the com-
munity to maintain its value and beauty but felt that the interference
with individual property rights was not in keeping with the U. S.
Constitution.47
While the courts of Pennsylvania have expressed considerable re-
luctance to allow legislatures to govern in the field of community ap-
pearance, Pennsylvania's eastern neighbor, New Jersey, has plowed into
the field with vigor and upheld a zoning ordinance having community
appearance as its major objective.48 Along with confirming that a mu-
nicipality may regulate the erection, construction, alteration, repair, or
use of buildings, the court stated that protection of the "character" of
a community and conservation of property values were prime considera-
tions in zoning regulation.49 The New Jersey Supreme Court, using
perhaps the most direct judicial words to date on the subject, supported
community aesthetics in the following statement:
41 Boden v. City of Milwaukee, 8 Wis. 2d 318, 99 N.W. 2d 156 (1959).
42 Id.
43 City of Columbus v. Stubbs, 223 Ga. 765, 158 S.E 2d 392 (1967).
44 Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
45 Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A. 2d 118 (1954).
46 Supra, n. 44 at 412.
47 Supra, n. 45 at 122.
48 Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Wayne Township, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A. 2d 693 (1952).
49 Id. at 696.
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It is in the public interest that our communities, so far as feasible,
should be made pleasant and inviting and that primary considera-
tions of attractiveness and beauty might well be frankly acknowl-
edged as appropriate under certain circumstances, in the promo-
tion of the general welfare of our people.5 0
It is apparent that housing regulation as it relates to aesthetics and
other values less directly related to public health, safety and welfare
is accepted with differing degrees of enthusiasm depending upon the
jurisdiction examined.
Conclusion
The Shaker Heights Housing Code, viewed as a whole, is a sound
piece of municipal legislation, promoting the desirable and lawful ob-
jective of community maintenance. There are, however, objectionable
portions of the code, and the legality of its enforcement in certain re-
spects is highly questionable. The aesthetic requirements, for example,
even if found to be valid, are not supported with sufficient criteria to
guide inspectors in deciding whether or not a violation exists. For this
reason, the aesthetically based code provisions would probably fail a
court test.
It seems unlikely, though, that a court test will materialize even
though City officials become quite concerned when inquiries are made re-
garding the code.5 1 This unlikelihood stems from the fact that the City of
Shaker Heights has for years been regarded as aesthetically beautiful
and has maintained stable property values. Generally, the residents of
the city understandably support measures designed to retain these char-
acteristics even though the measures taken somewhat reduce freedoms
previously enjoyed. Because of this acceptance of the goals of the code,
residents usually comply with, rather than challenge, notices of viola-
tion.
In this regard it is worthwhile to note that deterioration can be pre-
vented most effectively by enforcement of higher standards of mainte-
nance in good neighborhoods. 52 In support of early, anticipatory enact-
ment of home maintenance regulations, one court has stated "it re-
quires as much official watchfulness to anticipate and prevent suburban
blight as it does to eradicate city slums." 53
Even though it is unlikely, should a court test of the questionable
provisions be undertaken, it is hazardous to predict that they will be
ruled invalid. As with all legislation, the code is protected by the place-
-0 Borough of Point Pleasant Beach v. Point Pleasant Pavilion Inc., 3 N.J. Super.
222, 66 A. 2d 40, 41 (1949).
51 Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, supra, n. 1.
52 Supra, n. 48 at 697.
53 City of Cleveland v. Antonio, 100 Ohio App. 334, 124 N.E. 2d 846 (1955).
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ment of the burden of proving unconstitutionality on the shoulders of
the homeowners 54 who may not have the time nor the inclination to
accept the burden. It is further protected by the judiciary's historic
position that it will not interfere with legislation because the determi-
nation of the need for municipal regulation and the reasonableness of
the enactment is a matter of legislative not judicial concern.55 Con-
sequently, legislation will not be overthrown unless clearly arbitrary,
unreasonable or unrelated to public health, safety, morals or welfare.56
It is worthy of mention that the United States Supreme Court has
stated emphatically that regulations must change with the times and
that some regulations that are sustained today would have been held to
be unreasonable and arbitrary in the past.57 Changing conditions dic-
tate changes in regulation in all areas, including housing, and the courts
might well decide, after viewing the rapid death of America's inner
cities, that strict measures, heretofore deemed unreasonable, must be
taken and enforced in order to preserve this most important aspect of
our daily existence.
54 Supra, n. 3; Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E. 2d 854
(1957).
55 Stary v. City of Brooklyn, 162 Ohio St. 120, 121 N.E. 2d 11 (1954).
56 Supra, n. 13 at 383.
57 Supra, n. 3.
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